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This 
study provides a model for the valuation of the benefits associated with
government guarantee programs. The model generates the social value of a govern-
ment loan guarantee under disequilibrium conditions that justify public investment
as a second best decision rule. The social value of a loan is obtained by conditioning
the benefits on the survival of the borrowing firm. An estimated hazard function
captures the annual rate of benefit attrition resulting from the failure of borrowing
firms. Benefit-cost indexes are generated by business class, thus providing ex ante
asset allocation guidelines. Application of the model to a portfolio of loan guarantees
administered by the Ontario Development Corporation indicates a positive social
value under the assumed disequilibrium conditions.
THE VALUATION OF GOVERNMENT




The focus of this study is on government loan guarantees to
private businesses. In both Canada and the United States,
financing of small business through direct loans and guaranteed loans
has become a major component of government disbursements to the
private sector. Today, there are about 14 permanent agencies of gov-
ernment in Canada providing financing to private sector firms under
about 76 programs. In the United States, both federal and state gov-
ernments have programs that support the financing of small business.
A major gap exists in the finance and economics literature with
respect to the valuation of the social benefits of government loan
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programs, with the existing tools for a cost-benefit analysis of govern-
ment loans still at a rudimentary stage. This study develops a valuation
model for government loan guarantees that measures the social bene-
fits of government-sponsored loans to businesses in terms of the
income generated by the borrowing firms. The model can be used for
program evaluation where the primary interest is the effectiveness of
a particular lending program in achieving the anticipated benefits. In
addition, ex ante benefit-cost indexes by business class provide guide-
lines for asset allocation within a loan guarantee portfolio. The appli-
cation of the model is illustrated through a valuation analysis of the
small business loan programs of the Ontario Development Corpora-
tion (ODC).
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, I review the
existing literature. The subsequent section presents the valuation
model for loan guarantees, and the section that follows it applies to
the loan guarantee program of the ODC. The final section concludes
the study, identifies its policy implications, and suggests some future
research possibilities.
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Government lending for private investment has been rationalized
on the basis of positive and normative considerations. The positive
arguments justify public financing of private investment as an efficient
response to the failure of private credit markets, whereas the normative
arguments support a wide variety of public benefit arguments such as
employment, economic diversification, and technological growth.
With respect to credit market failure, the key theoretical and empirical
questions relate to the causes of credit market failure, the extent to
which it exists in the credit markets, and the effectiveness of govern-
ment loan programs as market correction mechanisms.
Asymmetric information in credit markets and the moral hazard and
adverse selection consequences have been well documented in the
credit-rationing literature by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Chan and
Kanatas (1985), and Besanko and Thakor (1987), among others;
whereas studies of interest rate and other lending practices of banks
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such as that of Wynant and Hatch (1991) reveal practices that may
cause firms that could borrow in an otherwise competitive market to
be denied credit. Break (1965) argued that a government-sponsored
loan program for market failure correction should offer loan terms and
conditions that would prevail in an efficient and competitive market
for that type of loan.
The argument that government lending resolves a market failure
problem is, however, undermined by the large subsidy component and
high rate of default among government borrowers. Subsidies in Can-
ada on government loans to private enterprises for 1978-1979 were
estimated at 1 % to 41 % of outstanding loans, depending on the
program.’ For the ODC, 1990 loan losses constituted 5.9% of out-
standing loans and guarantees.2 By contrast, Wynant and Hatch (1991)
report that the actual average loss for Canadian-chartered banks for
domestic loans during 1987-1989 was 0.39% of average outstanding
loans.
The subsidies and loss rates in government loan programs make it
necessary to look for alternative rationalizations for such programs.
One promising approach is to analyze government financing of private
investment as public investment decisions with private sector firms
being the instruments of public investment. Stated in these terms, the
financing of private sector investment can be justified as second best
rules for public investment in a regime of disequilibrium in the labor
and capital markets. Marchand, Mintz, and Pestieau (1985) have
justified public investment in a regime under which both the real wage
and the real rate of interest are set too high to clear the labor and capital
markets.3 Implicit shadow prices for labor and capital are shown to be
less than market prices. This theory provides a welfare-theoretic
justification for government loans.
Studies of the social benefits of government loans such as Break
(1965) and Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987) evaluate a govern-
ment loan by focusing on the magnitude of the government subsidy
contained in government credit as a basis for establishing whether the
social benefits are at least equal to the subsidy. In empirical work using
U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) data, Rhyne (1988) esti-
mated that for SBA loans the subsidy value of a loan is 11 % of the
loan amount. Therefore, the criterion of benefit is that the incremental
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benefits attributed to a loan must equal or exceed 11 % of the loan
value. A somewhat more comprehensive measure of cost is used by
the Economic Council of Canada (1982) and Brent (1991), making
use of the theory of economic cost-benefit analysis. The loss of
welfare, as measured by the benefits that society forgoes by investing
funds in subsidized ventures rather than in the private sector, is the
cost of government intervention. The Economic Council of Canada
estimated, for example, that for fiscal 1978-1979, the social opportu-
nity cost of a government loan was 14.26% of the loan amount.
The literature on the social costs and benefits of government loans
suffers from the weakness that, although the subsidy costs of loans
were estimated, no corresponding attempt was made to estimate
benefits. In an obvious recognition of this deficiency, Rhyne (1988)
observed in her SBA study, &dquo;With respect to externality goals, the
information here cannot conclusively state whether SBA loans pro-
duce enough benefits to compensate for the subsidy&dquo; (p. 91). Brent
( 1991 ) has formulated a model that provides a cost-benefit analysis of
a government loan by analyzing the loan as a public expenditure while
evaluating the social benefits in terms of the redistribution implicit in
the subsidized rate of interest charged to specified target groups of
borrowers. The model, however, does not consider the consequences
of the failure of firms for the anticipated benefits of the public
investment. The contribution of this article is the presentation of a
model that considers both social costs and benefits as well as the
possibility of firms defaulting and/or failing after receiving a govern-
ment loan.
THE MODEL
From society’s perspective, a loan guarantee achieves its welfare
objectives if the project undertaken with the loan guarantee generates
income in excess of the social cost of funds. The social cost and
benefits are modeled under the following assumptions:
1. Loans within the government portfolio represent a net increase in
credit availability.s
267
2. There is involuntary unemployment as identified by Marchand et al.
(1985) such that public investment is justifiable as a second best
investment rule.
THE BENEFITS OF A LOAN GUARANTEE
The benefits of a loan guarantee are assumed to be given by the
income generated and is captured by the net income of the project.
When there is no economic slack, the real productive activity associ-
ated with the loan may lead to the displacement of the income of
competing nonborrowing businesses. Our assumed involuntary unem-
ployment implies that the income resulting from the loan is a net
addition with the annual net income for a single project given by Y.
The present value at time 0 of the perpetual benefit on a default-free
loan is
where r8 is the social discount rate.
Ex ante, the duration of the expected benefits of a loan depends on
the survival of the borrowing firm. The uncertainty associated with
the duration of benefits is captured by specifying a survival distribu-
tion of firms in the loan portfolio. Firms are thus assumed to be
exposed to a loan spell at the initiation of the loan, with the spell lasting
for the loan period. If the firm defaults, the spell ends and the firm is
deemed to have failed. If the firm survives the loan spell, it is assumed
to continue forever. The latter assumption, although strong, is increas-
ingly inconsequential in an intertemporal setting the longer the loan
term.
There are several equivalent methods of characterizing the proba-
bility distribution of the survival of firms over time.6 Let T = the
survival time of a randomly selected firm, where survival time covers
all states in which the firm is not in default including the period beyond
the loan term. The survival time T is a random variable with probability
density function given by
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The cumulative distribution is F(t) = Prob(T< t) or the probability that
spell duration time T is less than some fixed value t, whereas the
survivor function S(t) = Prob(T > t) = 1 - F(t) is the probability that
survival time will equal or exceed a given value t.7 For a loan with a
payment term of t*, the probability that the firm will not default during
the loan term is S(t*).
The hazard rate (h(t)) is the conditional probability that a firm
completes its spell at t given that it has survived to t and is related to
the probability distribution and survival distribution through h(t) =
f(t)lS(t). The function h(t) characterizes the immediate risk attached to
firms known to have survived to a given age t and is thus the transition
rate from survival to failure. Over the lifetime of a firm, the rate at
which society loses the benefits of the loan in each year is the transition
rate from survival to failure during that year and is given by h(t).
Define Y(t) as the &dquo;hazard-adjusted benefit&dquo; of a loan during period t.
Then the expected benefit of the loan during t after deducting the
benefit loss resulting from failure during t is Y(t) = Y[1 - h(t)]. The
annual hazard-adjusted benefit over the loan term is given by the
following set of equations:
Assuming that the hazard-adjusted benefit in the final year of the loan
is sustained permanently, and letting
we can more compactly specify Y(t) as follows:
The present value of the hazard-adjusted benefits of a loan is
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THE SOCIAL COST OF A GOVERNMENT LOAN GUARANTEE
Mintz, Carriere, and McCaughey (1984) have analyzed the oppor-
tunity cost of a loan guarantee as being the sum of the cost of default
and the administrative cost of processing loans less any fees charged
by the government. The issue of whether to cost loan guarantees at
their social opportunity cost or at the actual monetary outlay is
resolved by assuming that the resources for the settlement of defaults
and administrative costs are withdrawn from the private sector’s
productive activities rather from a new supply of resources. The social
opportunity cost Cs is thus given by
where e = the portion of resources drawn from productive activity, C
is the private firm’s opportunity cost of using the resource, and C. is
the individual’s evaluation of the last unit of foregone activity. With e =
1, C, = C and the opportunity cost of the loan guarantee for a given
project is
where C(0) = the social cost at time 0 of the loan guarantee, L(0) = the
present value of losses paid by the government when the loan goes
into default, a = the fee per dollar of loan disbursement charged by
the government as a guarantee fee, 8 = the administrative cost per
dollar of loan disbursement, and K = the amount of the loan.
With the exception of the administrative cost, a disbursement is
made only if the loan goes into default and the guarantee is called, thus
making resource cost of the loan guarantee a contingent obligation.
The valuation of loan guarantees as contingent obligations has been
addressed in the options valuation literature.8 The basis of the valu-
ation of a loan guarantee is that the value of a bank loan is the loan’s
risk-free value less the value of a put option written on the assets of
270
the borrowing firm and sold to the shareholders of the borrowing firm
by the bank. The bank’s risk premium is reflected in the option
premium of the put, whereas the put option allows the shareholders to
walk away from their obligation to the bank when the company is
insolvent. When the government puts in place a loan guarantee, the
cost of the put option is assumed by the government, thus relieving
the borrowing firm of the cost of the risk premium that it would have
paid for bank financing. The cost of the loan guarantee to the govern-
ment is, therefore, the option premium. For empirical work, however,
valuation of the put option in a loan guarantee presents some intrac-
table problems. When a loan is amortized (as is the case with many
government loan schemes), the put option is a package of sequential
options, each with an exercise price equal to the payment due on the
loan for a particular year. A second problem that is especially severe
for small firms is how to obtain the market values of the assets of the
borrowing firms on which the put option is assumed to be written.
As an alternative to the options valuation model, we can specify the
cost of a loan guarantee in terms of an actuarial reserve that represents
the present value of the expected losses to the government under the
guarantee. If the sequence of put options implicit in a loan guarantee
reflects the risk of the borrowing firm, then the actuarial reserve would
mimic the present value of acquiring a series of put options during the
period of the guarantee.
Let a(t) = the annual contracted payment on the loan for year t. The
annual attrition of the payments on the loan is given by the transition
rate of firms from survival to failure for each year. The expected annual
loss is, therefore, the difference between the contracted payment on
the loan a(t) and an expected payment a(t), which is the hazard-
adjusted annual payment on the loan based on the hazard function h(t).
Let L(t) denote the expected loss in period t. The annual loan loss
for the given hazard function h(t) is given by the following set of
equations:
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or more compactly as
The present value of the hazard-adjusted loan loss represents the
actuarial reserve that is needed to satisfy the guarantee and is
given by
whereas the hazard-adjusted social cost is now
The ex ante or expected net present social value of a loan guarantee
V(0) is the difference between the hazard-adjusted benefits and costs
and is given by
The Benefit-Cost Index of a Loan Guarantee
The benefit-cost ratio is defined as the ratio of the present value of
gross benefits to cost as follows:
In the presence of a government budget constraint for funding loan
losses, decision rules based on the net present value of social benefits
will be suboptimal because funds may be directed toward individual
projects with large values, whereas in fact several small loans with a
high ratio of benefits to cost may in fact provide a higher aggregate
social benefit. The benefit-cost criterion provides a basis for selecting
projects for fmancing. For example, ex ante benefit-cost indexes for
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specific business classes could provide project selection guidelines for
lending agencies under loan guarantee programs.
The Minimum Required Duration
A government agency might be interested in the minimum survival
time that is necessary for a loan to break even in social terms. The
minimum required duration of the loan t,,,. is obtained by solving for
the number of years over which the hazard-adjusted income equals the
social cost of the loan:
Only projects that are expected to survive beyond the minimum
required duration would have positive social net present values. How-
ever, project selection using the minimum required duration would be
biased in favor of projects with high initial incomes and may not be
consistent with a criterion that selects projects with high positive social
net present values. Thus the minimum required duration rule may be
more appropriate when there are budgetary constraints on the funding
of loan losses.
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW VENTURES
LOAN PROGRAM OF ONTARIO
The loan guarantee program of the ODC is the New Ventures
Program (NVP), which is designed to assist small business start-ups
by guaranteeing personal loans of up to $15,000 for a 5-year term from
a participating financial institution. Borrowers are required to provide
a matching equity contribution from their own resources. Repayments
are interest-only for the first year with principal repayments spread
over the subsequent 4 years. When a borrower defaults, the lending
institution submits a claim to the ODC, which then pays off the loan
balance and pursues recovery of the outstanding amount.
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The empirical objective is to establish whether a sample of NVP
loans has a positive social value. Values are calculated for individual
loans and used to obtain portfolio totals and averages for social values,
benefit-cost indexes, and minimum required durations. The social
values are calculated for the business classes represented in the loan
portfolio. Benefit-cost indexes are calculated for each business class
and tested for homogeneity across business classes with both paramet-
ric and nonparametric tests.
The NVP valuation analysis is based on a sample of 467 loans
drawn sequentially from the starting date of the program, which was
September 1986. Loan data were supplied by the ODC and are
classified into six industrial classes: retail, food, manufacturing,
service/tourism, construction, and wholesale/distribution. The raw
loan data are summarized in Table 1. (In this and other tables, no Class
3 is identified.) The total amount of loans disbursed is $6.3 million
with the average loan size being $13,343. Both in terms of number of
loans and amount, the retail and service/tourism sectors dominate the
portfolio, each accounting for about one third of the program.
There are some parametric families of survival distributions such
as the Weibull and lognormal. However, in the estimation of paramet-
ric distributions, it is assumed that the functional form of the distribu-
tion in the absence of censoring9 is known. However, the data for this
study are censored, with a 5-year observation period starting in Sep-
tember 1986 and ending in September 1991. Thus nonparametric
techniques are used to estimate the survival distribution. The estima-
tion method is the life table method that splits the survival times into
equal time intervals. 10 Failure is assumed to occur on the date the bank
calls the guarantee. Table 2 summarizes the raw failure data by
business class. Out of the total sample of 467 loans, there were 141 1
failures with the remaining 326 loans being censored.
Hazard-adjusted benefits and costs based on the total sample hazard
function would be inaccurate if the underlying survival function
differs by business class. To determine the homogeneity of survival
functions across business classes, I applied two tests for homogeneity.
The log-rank test places more weight on larger survival times, whereas
the Wilcoxon test places more weight on early survival times. Table 3
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TABLE 1 : New Ventures Loans: Summary Data
TABLE 2: Summary of Number of Censored and Uncensored Values
presents hazard function estimates for all six business classes. All the
estimated hazard rates satisfy a 95% confidence interval for a normal
distribution. Both the log-rank and Wilcoxon tests are unable to reject
the null hypothesis of homogeneity, indicating that the survival esti-
mates are homogeneous across all survival times. Based on this result,
I applied the total sample hazard function estimates to the determina-
tion of hazard-adjusted benefits and costs.
The survival estimates for the total sample are presented in Table
4. The probability estimates for the survivor function and the hazard
function all satisfy a 95% confidence interval for the normal distribu-
tion. The cumulative survival rate is .7281, indicating that 27% of
firms in the program fail in the long run. The hazard function rises and
falls, peaking during the second year of the loan with the probability
of a surviving firm failing at that point in time being .13. A slight
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TABLE 3: Hazard Estimates, by Business Class
NOTE: All hazard estimates satisfy a 5% confidence interval under the assumption of
a normal distribution. Test of equality over business classes: log-rank-x2 = 4.0716, df =
5, p > X2 = .5392; Wilcoxon-x2 = 4.0225, df= 5, p > X2 = .5462.
TABLE 4: Life Table Survival Estimates for New Ventures Loans
a. All hazard estimates satisfy a 5% confidence level under the assumption of a normal
distribution.
increase in the hazard function is observed for the fifth year of the
loan, which is the terminal year of the loan.
To calculate the social net present value and benefit-cost indexes,
the following parameter values are used.
Administrative costs. Participating commercial banks are allowed
to charge an administrative fee of $150, which is deducted from the
loan amount as reimbursement for loan processing costs. In addition,
the ODC incurs expenditures for administering the NVP. However,
the ODC does not charge borrowers a fee for the guarantee. As at
March 31, 1989, the program had incurred total administrative expen-
ditures (including the administration fee) of $2,983,347 on total loan
guarantees of $139,996,434, making for an administrative cost of
$0.0213 per dollar of loan guarantee.&dquo; Thus the parameter values for
equation (7) are 8 = 0.0213 and a = 0.
The discount rate. The social discount rate is assumed to be the
borrowing rate of the government of Ontario. Musgrave and Musgrave
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(1984) justify the borrowing rate as being appropriate for state and
provincial governments that are primarily concerned with the alloca-
tion of resources within their specific regions and not on a nationwide
basis. The discount rate is the yield to maturity on the 5-year Ontario
Bond, which was 9.45% on September 1,198612; therefore, r8 = .0945.
Loan interest rate. A loan interest rate is required for the calculation
of the required annual payment on a loan. The NVP interest rate is
either the lender’s prime commercial rate plus 1 % or the lender’s fixed
interest rate for similar projects. Our analysis is based on the prime
commercial lending rate as reported by the Bank of Canada’3 for the
end of September 1986. On this basis, prime plus 1% is 10.75%.
Income. The income of the project is based on the first-year pro-
jected net income reported by the business in its loan application. The
reported income figure may be upwardly biased if loan applicants
generally tend to exaggerate the expected income of the project.
However, by using only first-year reported net income and thus
excluding income growth, there is some offset against the excessively
optimistic projections.
Equations (3) and (4) are based on the assumption that the income
benefits of the loan are sustained permanently if the loan is paid off
by the maturity date. The calculated social value of the loan based on
this assumption is thus an upper bound. For purposes of comparison,
I also calculated a lower bound that assumes that social benefits
terminate at the end of the loan term. One insight that is gained from
this comparison is that we are able to establish whether the lower
bound is positive.
VALUATION RESULTS
The calculated social values and minimum required durations are
presented in Table 5, both by business class and in total. The lower
bound and upper bound values for all business classes are positive.
For the entire portfolio, we have a lower bound of $56.6 million and
an upper bound of $131.3 million. The average social values per loan
are $0.121 million (lower bound) and $0.281 million (upper bound).
The average minimum required duration for the entire portfolio is
0.1952 years or 2.34 months. The minimum required duration varies
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TABLE 5: Social Value of New Ventures Loan Guarantees (thousands of dollars)
significantly across business classes, being as high as 0.2539 (3.04
months) for Class 1 (retail) and as low as 0.0582 (0.69 months) for
Class 6.14
In Table 6, I present the benefit-cost index calculations. For the
entire portfolio, the benefit-cost index ranges from 68.95 (lower
bound) to 159 (upper bound). To test for the homogeneity of benefit-
cost indexes across business classes, I employed two tests: a one-way
analysis of variance (based on a normality assumption) and the non-
parametric Kruskall-Wallis test (based on the ranks in the data). The
null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected by both tests at probability
levels of .0001 and .0308, respectively. This result indicates that ex
ante rules for the selection of small business financing projects may
be made on the basis of ex ante benefit-cost indexes. For example, a
project selection rule that discriminates in favor of Class 7 projects
would generate higher aggregate social values.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND
FURTHER RESEARCH ISSUES
This study has presented a model for the valuation in social terms
of government loan guarantees for private investment. The structure
of the model reflects the notion that, under a government loan, a public
investment is undertaken using a private firm as the medium. In
contrast to a direct public investment, the social benefits of an invest-
ment that is undertaken through a private firm are conditional on the
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TABLE 6: Average Benefit-Cost Indexes
NOTE: ANOVA: Fvalue = 5.143, p > F= .0001; Kruskall-Wallis test: x2 = 12.31, df= 5,
p > X2 = .0308.
survival of the private firm. The use of the hazard function has
provided a means of capturing the attrition of benefits due to firm
failure. The hazard rate model also shows that it is not necessary for
the recipients of a government loan to survive permanently for the loan
program to have a positive social value. What is critical is that the firm
survives for the minimum required duration (t ). This perspective
suggests that a binary evaluation that views the contribution of gov-
ernment loans in terms of whether the borrowing firm failed or
survived may be simplistic.’s
Within the context of the limited literature on government-sponsored
loan programs, this article’s contribution is twofold. First, it contrib-
utes to the study of the benefit side of government loan programs,
which most of the existing literature has defined in terms of implicit
subsidies rather than direct benefits. Second, it introduces a method
for recognizing the attrition of benefits resulting from the failure of
firms. This methodological contribution provides opportunities for
enriching the few direct-benefit-oriented studies such as that of Brent
(1991).
The estimated benefits indicate net positive social values and high
benefit-cost ratios under the assumed disequilibrium conditions. The
assumption of fixed real wages and real interest rates under a labor
and capital markets disequilibrium is strong. However, Marchand
et al. (1985) note that the specified conditions may exist under price
flexibility if such flexibility is inadequate to clear markets in the short
run. The widespread use of minimum wages, unemployment benefits,
and restrictive employment protection laws suggests that such inflexi-
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bility exists in many economies. However, the magnitude of the
benefits and the low minimum required duration also reflect the
significant savings that accrue to loan guarantee programs because of
the deferral of government disbursements to the date on which the
lending institution calls the guarantee. The intertemporal framework
of the model used in this study makes it possible to capture fully the
value of this deferral, thus providing a partial justification for the
findings.
Policy formulation and implementation should recognize, first, that
departures from disequilibrium could imply social values that may be
much less or even negative. Second, to the extent that the social
benefits of the loan guarantee differ from the profitability of the loan
to a lending institution participating in the loan guarantee program,
the selection of borrowers by banks may lead to socially suboptimal
loans being made. In the NVP portfolio, there seems to be little
difference in the survival profiles of firms in different business classes
so that the differences in benefit-cost indexes are induced primarily
by differences in the rates of profitability of each business class. To
the extent that the participating banks use expected profitability as a
selection criterion, their project selection will be consistent with the
social optimum.
The article points to several directions for additional research. First,
the additionality of a loan is based on the assumption that there are no
private lenders willing to make the loan in the absence of the govern-
ment guarantee. To the extent that government loan guarantees crowd
out private lenders, private output is lost. Thus further research is
needed to establish the magnitude of such crowding out, if any.
Second, the survival distribution may be sensitive to the loan terms
and conditions specified within the government program. In the par-
ticular program studied in this article, there were minimal rules set by
the government. However, programs with distributional objectives
with interest rates and payment terms based on means tests could
endogenize the survival distribution.’6 Further theoretical and empiri-
cal research would establish the extent to which the survival distribu-
tion under a government loan program is endogenous to the terms and
conditions of the program. Finally, the availability of comparable data
on loans administered directly would provide an interesting compara-
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tive evaluation that would reflect key differences such as the value of
the deferral of disbursements, the differential screening ability of
private lending institutions compared to government-sponsored lend-
ing agencies, and differences in administrative cost.
NOTES
1. See Economic Council of Canada (1982).
2. Source: Development Corporations of Ontario (1991).
3. The regime corresponds to Malinvaud’s (1977) "classical unemployment."
4. The terms "firm" and "project" are used interchangeably. Benefits and costs are defined
only for the project for which the loan was made, and termination of the project means
termination of the firm.
5. Government lending agencies usually enforce this requirement by requiring prospective
borrowers to show evidence of having been turned down by a financial institution.
6. The discussion follows that of Cox and Oakes (1984). For a review of economic
applications, see Kiefer (1988).
7. The survival analysis literature follows the convention that F(t) = Prob(T< t) rather than
Prob(T &le; t) (Cox and Oakes 1984).
8. See, for example, Merton (1977) and Selby, Franks, and Karki (1988).
9. In survival analysis, subjects that are still alive at the end of the observation period are
said to be censored.
10. The alternative estimator is the Kaplan-Meier or product limit estimator. This estimator
has the disadvantage that the intervals for which the hazards are computed depend on the data.
11. See Ministry of Industry, Trade and Technology (1989).
12. Source: Financial Post Information Service (1986).
13. Source: Bank of Canada (1987).
14. Although the average minimum required duration is generally inversely related to the
social value of the loan, the ranking by business class may not be consistent. This occurs because
social costs are recovered sooner when initial income is high. For business classes with
cross-sectional skewness toward high income, the average minimum required duration would
have a more favorable ranking than would the net social present value.
15. This approach is widespread in the popular media. See, for example, "Loan Guarantees"
(1991).
16. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this observation.
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